Privacy & sensitive locations

Coordinates are personal data: re-identification risk, geomasking, aggregation thresholds and the checks to run before a release.

An aggregated grid where most cells are safe and one cell holds a single record. a cell with one person in it names that person421763285135241944315812739224633551841aggregated, and stillidentifyingAggregation is not anonymisation until a minimum count is enforced and the small cells suppressed

A coordinate that describes a person is personal data, and it is unusually identifying: home locations are nearly unique, and a handful of visited places is enough to re-identify somebody from an otherwise anonymous track.

The dangerous part is that the standard defences feel stronger than they are. Aggregation is not anonymisation until a minimum count is enforced — a grid cell with one record in it names that record, and publishing the grid publishes the person. Rounding coordinates is a grid by another name. Random displacement protects a point and not a pattern, because an attacker with the underlying population can undo it. Even a heatmap of enough points reconstructs the points.

Below: the concepts cover re-identification risk and what each technique actually protects against; the how-to guides implement masking, aggregation and thresholds; and the fixes are the releases that leaked despite one of them.

Learning paths run through this topic too — see the end of this page.

🧭 Start with the concepts

The ideas the how-to guides below assume you already have.

⚙️ Then do the task

Step-by-step walkthroughs with code you can copy and adapt.

🔧 When it breaks

The errors this topic produces, with the cause explained rather than just the command.

Related topics

Subjects that keep coming up alongside this one, most overlap first.

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